A ruling that stops halfway
On 13 November 2026, the Karnataka High Court decided Shri. Adbul Rahim v. State of Karnataka. The facts are short. A man living and working in Bengaluru was picked up by the police during a drive to identify illegal Bangladeshi immigrants and handed over to the Foreigners Regional Registration Office. On the same day, the FRRO passed a Movement Restriction Order under the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025. The order referred him to a Foundation in Bengaluru and directed that he “will not move out of the Utile Foundation till his repatriation”. He says he is an Indian citizen by birth and relies on a set of identity documents. The authorities dispute them.
The court upheld the order as within the authority of law. It also held that he could not be repatriated or deported until his nationality had been properly decided. That second holding is welcome. The first is where the trouble lies. The judgment accepts that the State must establish who a person is before it removes him, but not before it confines him. That is a distinction the law cannot sustain.
What the court got right
The court made three findings that deserve to be stated plainly. First, that the FRRO is not the body that decides nationality: “under the Foreigners Act, 2025 the adjudication of the documents submitted by the petitioner to prove that he is a foreign national is not vested to be done by the respondent No.5 – FRRO” (para 72). Second, that a fair process is owed even where the burden of proof lies on the person: “the legal requirement of carrying out a process which is fair, lawful and reasoned is notwithstanding the burden on the petitioner that he is required to demonstrate that he is an Indian citizen” (para 76). Third, that “The repatriation of the petitioner would arise only after there has been an adjudication of his nationality which admittedly has not been done in accordance with law” (para 80).
The court also recorded that the order itself contained “no adjudication of the various documents that have been relied upon by the petitioner to assert that he is an Indian citizen” (para 69). In other words, the State had not decided that he was a foreigner. It had only alleged it.
Determination must come first
Once that is accepted, the restriction order cannot stand on its own feet. The order rests entirely on the premise that the person before the authority is a foreigner. If that premise has not been determined, there is nothing to support the order except an allegation. An allegation of foreignness, however strongly held by the police, is not a finding. It cannot be the basis for taking away a person’s freedom to move, to work and to live at home.
The court’s own reasoning points this way. It held that repatriation must wait for a lawful adjudication of nationality because repatriation only makes sense for a foreigner. The same is true of a restriction order. Both measures assume the very fact that is in dispute. If the State may not deport a man until it has shown he is a foreigner, it should not be able to confine him on the same unproven footing, indefinitely, while it gets around to showing it. The determination must precede the restriction, not follow it, and certainly not be carried out, as happened here, after the order and during the pendency of the writ petition.
Any other approach reverses the proper order of things. It allows the State to act first and justify later, and it places the cost of the State’s delay entirely on the person who says he is a citizen.
Restriction or detention?
The second difficulty is one of labels. The petitioner argued that the provision relied on does not authorise detention. The court answered that the order “does not indicate that the petitioner has been detained at the Foundation. Vide the impugned order the petitioner has been referred to the Foundation and directed not to leave the Foundation” (para 77).
With respect, that is a distinction of words, not of substance. A person who is picked up by the police, placed in a facility he did not choose, and told he may not leave it until he is removed from the country is detained. Calling it a “referral” or a “restriction on movement” does not change what happens to him. He cannot go home, cannot work, and cannot be with his family. The end date is not fixed by any court but by the completion of a repatriation that, on the court’s own finding, cannot lawfully take place until his nationality is decided. It is worth recalling that he had first approached the High Court with a habeas corpus petition, which is the remedy for unlawful detention.
Restriction and detention are, in a case like this, de facto the same thing. When the State uses the softer word to describe the harder reality, the semantics serve only one purpose: to place the measure outside the safeguards that the law attaches to detention. That is precisely what the courts should not permit.
The case for an effect test
Indian constitutional law already has the tool to deal with this. In its fundamental rights jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has long looked at the effect of State action on a person’s rights, rather than at the form the State gives it or the name it chooses. The question is what the measure actually does to the individual.
A version of that effect test should be applied to orders under the 2025 Act. A court examining a movement restriction order should ask: can the person leave the place he has been sent to? Is the restriction tied to an open-ended event such as repatriation? What does it do to his liberty, livelihood and family life? Where the honest answer is that he cannot leave, for an indefinite period, the order should be treated as detention for every legal purpose, whatever it is called. It must then meet every requirement that the Constitution and the statute place on detention.
Applied here, the test would not have allowed the order to survive on the ground that it was only a “restriction”. It would have required the State to show a lawful basis for detaining a man whose foreignness had not been determined. On the court’s own findings, it could not have done so.
The Karnataka High Court has rightly said that no one is to be deported on an allegation. The next step is to say that no one is to be confined on one either.
This post is commentary and not legal advice.

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